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PART 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Subject and Aim 
 
The subject of this thesis is the use of the precautionary principle in WTO dispute settlement. 
 
The aim is to display how and to what extent the WTO panels and the Appellate Body take 
into account the precautionary principle in interpreting the WTO covered agreements. 
 
 
1.2. Background and Topicality 
 
1.2.1. Globalization and the Need to Protect the Environment 
 
Over the past six decades we have experienced fundamental changes with regards to trade of 
goods and services. As a result of the development of cross-border interactions between 
countries, national economies are increasingly integrated into what is now a complex global 
economic system.1  
 
This trend towards economic globalization emerged in the wake of World War II, with the 
global recognition of the need to establish an international trade-system specifically 
promoting liberalization of free trade in goods and services between nations. Consequently, 
numerous countries have since entered into the globalized economic system by becoming 
parties to international trade agreements, which are today administered by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).2 
 
 
1.2.2. The Challenge of Balancing Free Trade and Environmental Protection 
 
The world has seen severe changes in the global environment, which are closely linked to 
global trends in international trade. Serious environmental threats, such as depletion of the 
stratospheric ozone layer, air and water pollution, extinction of endangered species, 
deforestation and global warming have increased rapidly in the last sixty years. The growing 
global economic activity is partly responsible for the environmental damage, which in the last 
years has become increasingly self-evident to the international community. Therefore, trade 
liberalization and environmental protection may, prima facie, be seen as two contradicting 
objectives.  
 
However, at a basic level, economic activity is dependent on the environment in terms of, 
inter alia, sustainable management of natural resources and energy production.3 There is 
therefore a need for harmonization between free trade and environmental protection. 
Potential conflicts between the rules on free trade within the WTO and environmental norms 
imposing restricting freedom of trade seems inevitable, as the latter in reality may effectively 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 International Institute of Sustainable Development (IISD): International Trade and Environment: A Handbook 
– Second Edition: http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?pno=754, p. 1. 
2 Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle, and Catherine Redgwell: “International Law & the Environment” (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 3rd edition, 2009), p. 753. 
3 IISD, supra note 1, pp. 1-2. 
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act as a barrier to trade. Consequently, as international environmental law is gradually being 
shaped into a system of legally binding rules, WTO is facing major challenges in balancing 
trade and environmental concerns.  
 
 
1.3. Legal Methodology 
 
 
1.3.1 WTO Law and International Environmental Law: Traditional Sources4 
 
1.3.1.1 The WTO Regime and Sources of Law 
 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade adopted in 1947 (1947 GATT) was a treaty 
designed to operate under the umbrella of the International Trade Organization (ITO). 
However, since the negotiators were unsuccessful in establishing the ITO, 1947 GATT 
entered into force on a “provisional” basis in 1948 and was the main treaty regulating 
international trade for more than four decades.5  
 
As a result of the 8th negotiation meeting between the GATT contracting parties known as the 
Uruguay Round (1986-94), the 1947 GATT was replaced by the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement) which entered into force 
January 1, 1995.6 In addition to the establishment of the WTO, the WTO Agreement created 
GATT which simply refers to the provisions of the terminated 1947 GATT7 (supplemented by 
a number of understandings), and incorporated trade agreements that had been created after 
the 1947 GATT into the new treaty regime.8  
 
The function of the WTO is, inter alia, to oversee the “implementation, administration and 
operation” of these “multilateral trade agreements” 9 which are legally bound upon all WTO 
members. Thus, the main sources of WTO law are the WTO Agreement and the multilateral 
trade agreements covered in the treaty (WTO covered agreements). 
 
 
1.3.1.2 International Environmental Law and Legal Sources 
 
In the 1960s, due to the increasing global environmental degradation, protection of the 
environment went from being a national interest to an international concern. Essentially, two 
important documents triggered the world’s response to the emerging environmental threats. 
First, the Stockholm Declaration adopted in 1972 recognized the importance of, and the 
common need to, preserve and enhance the global environment.10 Second, the Brundtland 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The term “sources of law” in this sub-chapter must not be confused with neither relevant sources of 
international law (as a legal system) nor with relevant law before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, as will be 
mentioned later in this thesis. 
5 Malcolm D. Evans: “International Law” (New York: Oxford University Press, 3rd edition, 2010), p. 732 
6 Ibid. 
7 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, The Legal Texts: The 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 4 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 
(1994) (WTO Agreement), Article 1(a). 
8 Ibid, Article II. 
9 Ibid, Article III(1). 
10 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration), adopted 
at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment on June 16, 1972 
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Report (1987) confirmed the interdependence of protection of the environment and human 
development.11 After the Stockholm Declaration and the Brundtland Report, the number of 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and non-binding declarations increased 
rapidly.  
 
Thus, the main sources of international environmental law are legally binding MEAs and non-
binding principles deriving from declarations (“soft law”). However, since a great deal of 
environmental principles have been reiterated in numerous provisions under international 
conventions, first and foremost MEAs, they have in fact become legally binding, in terms of 
specific rights and obligations of the treaty parties. This raises the debate as to whether certain 
environmental principles have reached the status of customary international law.  
 
One such apparent example is the precautionary principle, the purpose of which is to 
encourage States to take appropriate protective action before full scientific proof of risk to the 
environment and human health.12 It is widely argued that there is a sufficient degree of 
consensus on the precautionary principle as a customary rule of international law.13 Since 
international law is a rather dynamic system, non-legal principles can in some cases change 
into customary rules quickly.14 Nevertheless, this thesis will not attempt to argue whether the 
precautionary principle has attained status as customary international law. The subject of this 
thesis will be scrutinized under the presumption that the precautionary principle is an 
established customary rule of international law.  
 
 
1.3.2. The Significance of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
 
It is important to keep in mind that WTO law and international environmental law are both 
rules of international law, and not different systems as such. Understanding the fundamental 
relationship between rules of international law is hence a prerequisite in order to explain 
specific tensions between these two branches. As this thesis will focus on how WTO law 
relates to non-written rules of international law, i.e. the precautionary principle, conflict-
avoiding techniques, first and foremost treaty interpretation, are of particular importance.  
 
The established principles of treaty interpretation are partly codified in Articles 31-33 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 31(3)(c) is particularly relevant in the 
context of treaties vs. general international law (international custom and general principles) 
as it requires “any relevant rules of international law” to be taken into consideration when 
interpreting a treaty.15 As the provision expresses the fact that agreements are part of 
international law, the question in this thesis is not whether, rather how and to what extent 
international environmental principles, in this case the precautionary principle, are applicable 
in WTO disputes.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland 
Report), published on 20 March 1987 
12 Halina Ward: Science and Precaution in the Trading System – Seminar Note (IISD Publication Centre, 1999), 
online: http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?id=402, p. 2. 
13 Evans, supra note 5, p. 695: Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, supra note 2 pp. 125-127. However, see EC 
Commission of the European Communities: Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary 
Principle (EC Communication), adopted on 2 February 2000, p. 11. The EC argues that the precautionary 
principle has attained the status of a general principle of international law.” 
14 Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, supra note 2, p. 108. 
15 United Nations Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), adopted on 23 May 1969, entered into 
force on 27 January 1980, Article 31(3)(c) 
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1.3.3 Choice of Legal Methodology 
 
This thesis will encompass the fields of WTO and environmental law, as well as public 
international law. In order to examine the role of the precautionary principle in WTO dispute 
settlement, traditional sources of international law will be analyzed. 
 
The primary WTO sources that will be used are, first, the WTO Agreement which is an 
“umbrella agreement” consisting of the covered agreements that are automatically binding on 
all members of the organization.16 Second, two of these covered agreements, GATT and the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) are 
important as they regulate the application of trade restricting measures. As the titles of these 
conventions describe, the provisions under GATT apply to measures in general, whereas the 
SPS provisions are only applicable with respect to sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures.17 
 
Moreover, the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) regulating the dispute settlement 
system is an important WTO treaty to consider. Article 1(1) stipulates that the DSU shall 
apply to disputes brought pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of 
the … “covered agreements””.18 The scope of jurisdiction of the WTO judiciary (the ad hoc 
panels and the Appellate Body) is hence limited to the “covered agreements”, i.e. the WTO 
treaties. The DSU does not, however, prevent the use of other rules of international law in the 
interpretation of the WTO covered agreements.19 
 
In this respect, the WTO judiciary is obligated to respect the customary rules of treaty 
interpretation. For the purpose of this thesis it is hence necessary to examine the content and 
scope of the principles of treaty interpretation enshrined in the VCLT. In this context, the 
precautionary principle, which is (arguably) deemed to be an established rule of customary 
international law binding upon the States, may be applicable in the interpretation of the WTO 
covered agreements. 
 
Furthermore, the WTO adjudicators established to clarify the provisions under the WTO 
covered agreements, provide rulings which are compulsory binding on the members. Their 
decisions must also, insofar they are relevant, be taken into consideration by later Panels.20 
Hence, WTO judiciary represents one of the strengths of the WTO, and the extent to which 
the WTO adjudicators take non-WTO norms into account have considerable impact on how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  WTO	  Agreement,	  supra	  note	  7,	  Article	  II.	  
17 Also see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations 17 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) (GATT), Article I; WTO Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, The Legal Texts: The Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1999) 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 (SPS Agreement), Article 1 
18 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations 354 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) (DSU), Article 1. Also see Article 
3(2) which stipulates that the DSU “serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered 
agreements.” 
19 See e.g. DSU Article 3(2). 
20 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II), 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996:I, 97, p. 15 
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WTO relates to general international law.21  For the purpose of this thesis, selected reports 
concerning conflicts with regards to protection of the environment and human health will be 
analyzed.  
 
Additionally, other Panels and Appellate Body reports as well as secondary sources, such as 
reports by the ICJ and the ILC, ECtHR case law and environmental reports and declarations 
will be used where relevant, in order to clarify and elaborate the discussed topics. 
Monographs and legal articles will also be used for these purposes, yet they are not of equal 
value. 
 
 
1.4. Delimitations and Definitions  
 
 
1.4.1. Delimitations 
 
Although it can be difficult to separate political issues in international law from the legal 
ones, this thesis will attempt to focus exclusively on the legal issues. 
 
Conflict of norms must not be confused with “conflict of laws”. The latter relates to conflicts 
between two legal systems, and concerns the proper choice of law.22 Moreover, his thesis will 
examine conflicts in the applicable law, and inherent normative conflicts will hence not be 
touched upon.  
 
Furthermore, “conflict of norms” shall rather refer to conflict between norms that are legally 
binding upon States. Thus, the interplay between norms and elements of pre-normative 
character will not be addressed. 
 
Only conflicts between WTO treaty and customary rules of international environmental law, 
namely the precautionary principle, will be examined. WTO challenges with respect to trade-
restricting provisions MEAs will not be touched upon. However, some MEAs will be 
mentioned where relevant, as they contain rules derived from the precautionary principle. 
 
Finally, there are several tools in avoiding and resolving conflicts of norms in international 
law. This thesis will focus solely on the general rule of treaty interpretation set out in Article 
31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as a conflict-avoiding technique. 
 
 
1.4.2. Relevant Definitions 
 
For the purpose of the thesis, the term “international law” will refer to “public international 
law”. Public international law is narrowly defined as a legal system of rules that regulates the 
rights and obligations of States, and the relationship between States and international 
governmental organizations, such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization.23 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Jeffrey Lagomarsino: “WTO Dispute Settlement and Sustainable Development: Legitimacy through Holistic 
Treaty Interpretation” (Pace Environmental Law Review, Vol. 28, 2011, 545-657), p. 545-546. 
22 Joost Pauwelyn: “Conflict of Norms in Public International Law. How WTO Relates to other Rules of 
International Law” (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 8 on defining “conflict of norms”. 
23 Public international law must not be confused with “private international law” which concerns procedural 
rules dealing with conflict between different legal systems.  
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The terms “norms”, “rules” and “principles” and will be used interchangeably, but will refer 
to rules that are legally binding upon the States, unless otherwise noted. 
 
The “WTO adjudicators” or the “WTO judiciary” are used a generic term for the Panels and 
the Appellate Body. 
 
Finally, the use of the terms “conventions”, “agreements” and “treaties” will refer to written 
agreements concluded between States and governed by international law.24  
 
 
 
PART 2: TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
2.1. Fragmentation of International Law 
 
Since its inception, international law has developed into a fragmented system consisting of 
various regimes with their own regulations, institutional settings and judicial bodies dealing 
with their respective objectives and needs. However, they are not considered to be self-
contained regimes, but rather “specialized regimes” within the framework of general 
international law. The problem that seems unavoidable is the risks of conflict between the 
specialized rules, as they often have no clear connection to one another.25 
 
Fragmentation of international law stems from several factors that characterize the 
international legal system. First, international law is decentralized, in that there is no supreme 
legislative authority creating the rules – the law-makers are the States. Nor does it have a 
central executive or a world judiciary.26 Second, international law is a horizontal system, in 
which the States also are subjects to the rules they create. However, since all States are 
entitled to full sovereignty and equality, they do not have to comply with a rule unless they 
have consented to do so (pursuant to the principle of pacta tertiies nec nocent nec prosunt). 
Thus, international law is based on State cooperation, and not subordination, which is typical 
in municipal legal systems.27 Third, international law lacks an inherent hierarchy of legal 
sources,28 which will be further examined in part 2.2.1. 
 
The danger of fragmentation as a trend in international law has been addressed by the 
International Law Commission (ILC). In 2002, the ILC established a Study Group to examine 
specific topics under this issue. The conclusions of the work of the Study Group were adopted 
by ILC in 2006.29 In applying international law where two or more norms are valid and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See VCLT, supra note 15, Article 2(1)(a) 
25 Anja Lindroos and Michael Mehling: “Dispelling the Chimera of “Self-Contained Regimes”. International 
Law and the WTO” (European Journal of International Law, Vol. 19 No 2, 2005, 857-877), pp. 857-858. 
26 Joost Pauwelyn, supra note 22, p. 13; Peter Malanczuk and Michael Barton Akehurst: “Akehurst’s Modern 
Introduction to International Law” (New York Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 7th edition, 1997), p. 3. 
27 Joost Pauwelyn: “The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?” (The American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 95, 2001, 535-578), p. 536. 
28 Ibid, p. 535.  
29 ILC Study Group: Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law (Fragmentation Report), 
A/CN.4/L.682, 3 April 2006, Appendix, 2006, p. 2. 
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applicable, the report states that one must define the exact relationship between the norms. 
Such relationships can fall into two general categories: relationships of conflict and 
relationships of interpretation.30  
 
 
2.2. Relationship Between Treaties and Customary International Law 
 
2.2.1. Treaties and Customary Rules as Sources of International Law  
 
The primary sources of international law are set out in Article 38(1) in the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute), which include: 
 
a. ”international conventions”  
b. ”international custom (…) accepted as law”, and  
c. ”general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”.31  
 
Perhaps the most distinct difference between “international conventions” and “international 
custom” is their respective binding force. A convention becomes legally binding upon a State 
only when the State has signed and ratified it.32 Hence, treaties are binding only to the parties 
to them.33  
 
Customary international law, on the other hand, binds all states. However, for international 
customs to be “accepted as law” requires (i) widespread and uniform State practice (ii) which 
is carried out with the belief that the practice is mandatory as a matter of law (opinio juris).34 
Thus, the creation of customary rules of international law also entail a form of acquiescence 
as the customs need to be “accepted as law” by a sufficient number of States. Therefore, as 
treaties and customary international law derive essentially from the same source, i.e. State 
consent, it is presumed that they are equal in value.35  
 
What determines the applicable law in cases of conflict will therefore be the content of the 
rules, rather than their source. Whereas treaty provisions often contain specific rules, 
international customs are characterized as more vague and ambiguous. Pursuant to the 
principle of lex specialis (law governing a specific subject matter), treaties will therefore 
normally prevail above customary international law, even though the latter is lex posterior 
(more recent law).36  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ibid, para. 2. 
31 Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute), adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 
1946, Article 38(1). 
32 VCLT, supra note 15, Article 14(1). A State may also consent to be bound to a treaty by acceptance, approval, 
or accession, see Articles 14(2) and 15. 
33 Ibid, Article 34. 
34 John H. Currie, Craig Forcese, Valerie Oosterveld: “International Law. Doctrine, Practice and Theory” 
(Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2007), p. 121. 
35 Pauwelyn, supra note 22, pp. 94-95. The only element of hierarchy between the sources of international law is 
the rules with the status of “jus cogens”. Those are peremptory norms that no treaty, custom or principle can 
overrule, see VCLT Article 53. 
36 Joost Pauwelyn: supra note 27, p. 536; Joost Pauwelyn: supra note 22, p. 133; John Bernetich: “Sovereignty 
and Regulation of Environmental Risk under the Precautionary Principle in WTO Law” (Vermont Law Review, 
Vol. 35, 2010-2011, 717-739), p. 719. An exception to lex specialis is when a treaty norms in contrary to a jus 
cogens, in which the former is void and terminates (pursuant to the principle of lex superior), see footnote 30 and 
part. 2.2.3.1. 
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Hence, in the case of the relationship between WTO rules and the precautionary principle, the 
former are applicable as lex specialis if there is a genuine conflict between the two. 
Consequently, if lex specialis is used as a conflict-solving tool in cases of conflicts between a 
WTO rule and a customary rule, the result will in most cases be in favor of the former. Hence, 
there is a need to first examine whether the conflict may be avoided before concluding that 
the norms are in fact contradictory. 
 
 
2.2.2. Solving Conflicts vs. Avoiding Conflicts 
 
A conflict between international norms may occur in two ways. The first type is referred to as 
“inherent normative conflict”, which is a situation whereby one of the two norms invalidates 
or terminates the other norm, or when a norm is illegal under the other. A typical situation is 
where a norm conflicts with jus cogens, under which the former rule would be void.37 The 
second type of conflict, and the one that is relevant for the purpose of this thesis, is “conflict 
in the applicable law”. In this case there is no hierarchy between the norms in question, and 
for that reason both rules continue to exist, but in any given case one has to choose which one 
that prevails over the other.38  
 
Furthermore, defining “conflict” in the applicable law seems to be a matter of ongoing 
discussion. Although I will not touch upon this debate in detail, it is necessary to suggest a 
proper definition for this thesis. The definition that is arguably prevalent in international law 
is rather narrow: “A conflict in the strict sense if direct incompatibility arises only where a 
party to the two treaties cannot simultaneously comply with its obligations under both 
treaties” (emphasis added).39 Pursuant to this approach, conflict between two norms can only 
arise in a case where both norms entail an obligation upon the country concerned. In this 
sense, contradiction between, inter alia, a prohibiting norm and a permissive norm is a 
“divergence”, and not a conflict. This strict and technical definition also seems to be 
prevailing in WTO case law.40 
 
However, since the WTO covered agreements impose not only obligations to liberalize trade, 
but also certain rights to restrict trade (e.g. SPS and TBT Agreements), several commentators 
have frequently stressed the need for WTO to adopt a broader definition of “conflict”.41 
Pauwelyn suggests that there is a conflict between two applicable norms “if one (of them) 
constitute, has led to, or may lead to, a breach of the other”42, typically in a case where one 
rule prohibits a type of conduct and the other permits the same conduct.  
 
This approach is perhaps more suitable in cases where a treaty provision may conflict with 
general international law, hereunder customary rules. The chosen definition does not, 
however, suggest that norms imposing different state conduct always conflict; they may either 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Patrick F.J. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton and Michael G. Plummer: “The World Trade Organization: Legal, 
Economic and Political Analysis. Chapter 31: Joost Pauwelyn: The Application of Non-WTO Rules of 
International Law in WTO Dispute Settlement” (New York: Springer Science+Business Media Inc., 2005), p. 
1420. Also see VCLT Article 53, which stipulates that “(a) treaty is void if (…) it conflicts with a peremptory 
norm of general international law. 
38 Ibid, p. 1420. 
39 Erich Vranes: “The Definition of “Norm Conflict” in International Law and Legal Theory” (The European 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 17 No 2, 2006), p. 401, citing Jenks. 
40 Ibid, p. 395. 
41 See e.g. Vranes and Pauwelyn. 
42 Pauwelyn, supra note 22, pp. 175-176, 275. 
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conflict or accumulate.43 Consequently, the definition allows the use of treaty interpretation as 
a technique in avoiding conflicts of norms, and is particularly relevant in situations of conflict 
between treaties and customary international law.  
 
 
2.2.3. Treaty Interpretation as a Conflict-Avoiding Technique 
 
2.2.3.1. The General Rule of Interpretation 
 
The general rule of treaty interpretation is set out in Article 31 in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties.44 The core elements of treaty interpretation are stipulated in Article 
31(1): 
 
“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose” (emphasis added). 
 
The first principle suggesting that a treaty must be interpreted “in good faith”, merely reflects 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda, meaning that the treaty “is binding upon the parties to it 
and must be performed by them in good faith”.45  
 
Furthermore, paragraph (1) draws on three different approaches to treaty interpretation: 
interpretation in accordance with (i) the textual meaning (objective approach), (ii) the 
intention of the parties (the subjective/contextual approach), and (iii) object and purpose of a 
treaty (teleological approach). Within the meaning of paragraph (1), however, they are not 
mutually exclusive, but necessarily dependent on one another.46 As ILC puts it: “the ordinary 
meaning of a term is not to be determined in the abstract but in the context of the treaty and in 
the light of its object and purpose.”47 Essentially, a proper interpretation of a treaty starts with 
the actual term and arrives at the contextual meaning.48 
 
Article 31(2) refers to the relevant sources that shall be taken into account when determining 
“the context” within the meaning of paragraph (1). In addition to the text, preamble and 
annexes of the treaty they comprise agreements “relating to the treaty which was made 
between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty”, and other instruments 
“which was by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and 
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.” Accordingly, a unilateral 
document is not to be considered as a part of “the context” unless it was made in the 
connection with the treaty, and accepted by the parties as such.49  
 
In addition to the context of the treaty, Article 31(3) stipulates that certain sources outside the 
treaty shall be taken into consideration. Particularly relevant to conflicts between treaties and 
customary international law is “the principle of integration” set out in paragraph (3)(c), which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Ibid, p. 200. 
44 VCLT, supra note 15 Article 31. 
45 Ibid, Article 26. 
46 Evans, supra note 5, p. 184. 
47 ILC Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries (ILC Draft Articles), adopted by the 
International Law Commission in 1966, p. 221, para. 12. 
48 Isabelle Van Damme: “Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body” (The European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2010 EJIL 2010, 605-648), p. 620. 
49 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 47, p. 221, para. 3. 
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permits the contextual use of other “relevant rules of international law”.50 What is 
extraordinary about the principle of integration is that it expresses the notion of treaties as a 
part of the wider corpus of international law.51 Article 31(3)(c) will be further examined in 
part 2.3.2.2.  
 
The ILC has underlined that Article 31 is entitled  “General rule” (and not ”General rules”), 
and for that reason Article 31 is designed to make treaty interpretation a unity process.52 
Accordingly, the rule does not aim to infer any hierarchy between the principles. The ILC 
also points out that the general rules comprises “principles of logic and good sense valuable 
only as guides to assist in appreciating the meaning which the parties may have attended to 
attach to the expressions that they employed in a document.”53 
 
Although numerous countries have not yet signed and ratified the VCLT, the general rule in 
Article 31 is widely accepted as customary international law, which has also been expressly 
acknowledged by the ICJ. Accordingly, the general rule is legally binding on all States, and 
not only the parties to the VCLT.54  
 
 
2.2.3.2. Article 31(3)(c): The Principle of Integration 
 
Originally, the general rule in Article 31(1) included a temporal element. In addition to the 
context of the treaty, the meaning of the terms was to be determined "in the light of the 
general rules of inter- national law in force at the time of its conclusion". Consequently, the 
provision allowed the interpreter to refer only to rules that existed at time the treaty was 
concluded. However, considering the dynamic nature of international law, in particular the 
possible changes of parties’ intentions, the ILC decided to remove the temporal element, and 
transfer the rule to paragraph (3)(c),55 which now reads:  
 
“There shall be taken into account, together with the context (…) any relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties”. 
 
Article 31(3)(c) contains three cumulative requirements. First, the norm referred to must be a 
“rule(…) of international law”. Hence, broader principles or considerations with a pre-
normative character are not comprised by the provision. On the other hand, the words do not 
make any restrictions as to the sources of international law. Thus, the interpreter may use all 
primary sources, i.e. conventions, customary international law and general principles.56, This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Other sources referred to in paragraph (3) include “any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding 
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions”, and “any subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”. 
51 Pauwelyn supra note 22, p. 253. 
52 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 47, p. 220, para. 8. 
53 Ibid, p. 218, para. 4 
54 See e.g. ICJ Report, Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment Report, ICJ Reports 1999, para. 
18. The ICJ also refers to previous reports where the Article 31 has been recognized as reflecting customary 
international law. Furthermore, the rule in Article 31 is only a partly codification of the customary rules on treaty 
interpretation. Other the rules, such as the principle of effectiveness and the prohibition of abusive 
interpretations were excluded by the ILC. Van Damme, supra note 48, p. 621. 
55 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 47, p. 22, para. 16. 
56 Pauwelyn, supra note 22, p. 254. 
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approach is supported by international and regional tribunals, and also affirmed by a WTO 
panel.57 
 
Second, Article 31 (3)(c) applies only to sources that are “relevant” to the subject matter of 
the provision in question. According to the wordings, the source must at least shed light on 
the meaning of the rule. If there is no connection between them, the relevance standard is not 
met.58 
 
Third, the rules must “applicable in the relation between the parties”. In this connection, it has 
been frequently argued whether “the parties” refers to all the parties to the treaty or only those 
involved in the dispute. Customary rules of international law, however, are binding on all 
States; they will always be applicable between “the parties”, notwithstanding the unclear 
meaning of the term.59  
 
It is widely argued that more attention must be drawn to the principle of integration in order 
to achieve a more coherent practice of interpretation in international law.60 As for the WTO in 
particular, the Commission on Trade and Environment has stressed the need for the WTO 
adjudicators to take an evolutionary approach to treaty interpretation:  
 
“Article 31(3)(c) has an important bearing on trade and environment disputes, whereby environmental 
rules might have a basis in treaty were customary international law. In addition, the references to 
environment and sustainable development in the WTO Agreements might also provide entry points for 
the other rules of international law.”61 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that Article 31(3)(c) is not a separate rule of 
treaty interpretation, but a part of the larger interpretation process. As noted above, the 
starting-point is always the language of the terms in their context and in the light of the object 
and purpose of the treaty.62  
 
 
 
PART 3: THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM AND WTO 
APPROACHES TO THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
 
 
3.1. The WTO – A Self-Contained Regime? 
 
As was suggested by the ILC Study Group in the 2006 report, the phrase “self-contained” is 
in effect a misnomer; no legal regime is self-contained in that it is never clinically isolated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
(EC-Biotech), WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, Add.1 to Add.9, and Corr.1, adopted 21 November 
2006, DSR 2006:III-VIII, 847, para. 7.67. The panel expressly confirmed that customary rules of international 
law are “rules” within the meaning of Article 31(3)(c). 
58 Pauwelyn, supra note 22, pp. 263-264. 
59 Ibid, pp. 257-263. 
60 See e.g. Campbell McLachlan: “The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention” (International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 54 Issue 2, 2005, 279-319), pp. 280-281.  
61 WTO Committee on Trade and Environment: Report on Trade, Environment, and the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism, adopted in 2005, p. 6. 
62 Campbell McLachlan, supra note 60, p. 311. 
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from the rest of the law. As for the WTO as a treaty regime, the principle of lex specialis 
applies in many respects, but the institution is not a closed system. 63  
 
The WTO as a self-contained regime was also expressly rejected by the Appellate Body in the 
US-Gasoline case, where the tribunal said that that the GATT “is not to be read in clinical 
isolation from public international law”.64 Since then, subsequent practice of the panels and 
the Appellate Body has more or less followed the same approach,65 which this thesis will 
return to in part 3.2.2. 
 
 
3.2. WTO Dispute Settlement System 
 
3.2.1. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
 
The Dispute settlement system is administered by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which 
is a WTO political body established by the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) adopted by the WTO in 1994.66  
 
The main function of the DSB is to settle disputes that arise between the WTO members, 
where it has the exclusive authority to establish ad hoc panels, and adopt reports from the 
panels and the Appellate Body.67 The DSB is also responsible for monitoring the 
implementation of the rulings and recommendations by the WTO adjudicators, and to ensure 
that the countries concerned comply with a rule.68  
 
Before a case is taken before a panel, the parties to the dispute are first required to undertake 
consultation procedures in order to reach a consensus on the issue.69 If the consultations are 
unsuccessful, the complaining party may request for the establishment of a panel to hear the 
case. The report of the panel will include rules and recommendations which must be adopted 
by the parties involved in the dispute.70  
 
However, a party may appeal the panel decision (or certain rulings of the decision) to the 
Appellate Body, which is a permanent adjudicating body with the authority to uphold, modify 
or reverse the rulings of the panel.71 The report of the Appellate Body is final and compulsory 
binding upon the parties to the dispute, meaning that it has to be accepted and adopted 
unconditionally, unless the DSB in consensus decide not to do so.72  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 ILC Report, supra note 29, paras. 165, 192-193; Pauwelyn, supra note 27, p 539. 
64 Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US-
Gasoline), WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I, 3, p. 17 
65 Yenkong Ngangjoh Hodul: Perspectives on Legal Issues in WTO Jurisprudence in the First Half of 2010 
(Manchester Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 7, Issue 2, 2010, 106-118), p. 110. 
66 DSU, supra note 18, Article 2(1). 
67 Ibid, Article 2(1). 
68 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm 
69 DSU, supra note 18, Article 4. 
70 Ibid, Articles 6(1), 11 and 16(1). The panel report must also be adopted by the DSB to take effect, Article 
16(4). 
71 Ibid, Articles 16(4), 17(1) and (13). 
72 Ibid, Article 17(14). 
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3.2.2 General International Law as Reference Materials for the Interpretation of WTO 
Agreements 
 
The DSU does not contain any provisions expressly recognizing the precautionary principle 
as a relevant rule in WTO law. However, Article 3 refers to the customary principles of treaty 
interpretation. Paragraph 2 reads: 
 
“The Members recognize that (the Dispute Settlement System) serves to preserve the rights and 
obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those 
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. 
(emphasis added)” 
 
Article 3(2) does not make an express reference to VCLT Article 31.73 However, the 
Appellate Body has clarified the linkage between the text of DSU Article 3(2) and the general 
rule of treaty interpretation. In the US-Gasoline case, the court said as follows:  
 
“Article 31 is a “general rule of interpretation (which) has attained the status of a rule of customary or 
general international law. As such, it forms part of the "customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law" which the Appellate Body has been directed, by Article 3(2) of the DSU, to apply in 
seeking to clarify the provisions of the General Agreement and the other "covered agreements (…)".74  
 
This recognition of the rules on treaty interpretation as a part of international customary law 
has been reiterated in numerous subsequent panels and Appellate Body reports. Despite the 
lack of an explicit reference to Article 31 in the DSU, it is clear that the WTO acknowledges 
the general rule of treaty interpretation as applicable to the WTO judiciary. 
 
DSU Article 3(2) further provides that interpretation of WTO agreements must only be “in 
accordance” with customary international law of treaty interpretation. Thus, the panels and 
the Appellate Body are free to decide how to interpret the WTO covered agreements as long 
as the interpretation process is in conformity with the general rule. In this sense, Article 3(2) 
simply confirms the principle of jura novit curia, that the court knows the law and is therefore 
the competent body to choose the applicable law in a particular case.75 
 
However, Article 3(2) also contains an important interpretation limitation, namely that WTO 
adjudicators can only “clarify” the rules in the WTO agreements. In US-Wool Shirts and 
Blouses the Appellate Body states that Article 3(2) is not “meant to encourage either panels or 
the Appellate Body to ‘make law’ by clarifying existing provisions of the WTO Agreement 
outside the context of resolving a particular dispute.”76 Consequently, the courts shall only 
seek to find the clear content of the provisions – the interpretation cannot result in a change of 
the meaning of the rule than the parties originally intended.  
 
This limitation of interpretation is further emphasized in Article 3(2), requiring that 
recommendations and ruling by the panels and the Appellate Body must not “add to or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 One may question why the DSU negotiators did not make an explicit reference to the rules on treaty 
interpretations provided in Articles 31 to 33 of the VCLT. However, as there are some WTO members that are 
not (recognized) States, they cannot be parties to the VCLT, Damme, supra note 48, p. 608, footnote 2. 
74 US-Gasoline, supra note 64, p .17. 
75 Damme, supra note 48, p. 607-608. 
76 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from 
India (US-Wool Shirts and Blouses), WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997, and Corr.1, DSR 1997:I, 323, p. 
19. 
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diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements”. The latter sentence 
is reiterated in Article 19(2) regarding the recommendations of the panels and the Appellate 
Body in particular. 
 
 
3.3. The Precautionary Principle and Potential Gateways in WTO Law 
 
3.3.1. The Precautionary Principle 
 
The most well-known example of the precautionary principle is enshrined in Principle 15 of 
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration), which reads as 
follows:  
 
“Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be 
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation” 
(emphasis added).77  
 
The most striking feature of the precautionary principle is that it applies only when a State 
does not have “full scientific certainty” that a human action or policy will cause 
environmental damages.78 Accordingly, the principle “shifts” the burden of proof in that it 
removes a possible justification of State action, or rather inaction, when the environment may 
be at stake.79 
 
However, requiring “full” scientific proof would allow the precautionary principle to be 
invoked in all cases of environmental management. The standard of proof of risk has 
accordingly been lowered in a number of international conventions and court decisions. In the 
European Union for instance, the precautionary principle may be invoked where “scientific 
evaluation does not allow the risk to be determined with sufficient certainty”.80  
 
Therefore some scientific evidence of potential harmful effects to the environment is required. 
In this respect, the European Court has emphasized that protective measures may be taken 
before “the reality and seriousness of the risks become fully apparent” but they cannot 
“properly be based on a purely hypothetical approach to risk, founded on mere conjecture 
which has not been scientifically verified”.81 On the other hand, the WTO has stated that there 
is no requirement that the scientific proof is based on “the view of a majority of the relevant 
scientific community”.82 As one commentator suggests:  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 United Nations Declaration on Environment and Trade (Rio Declaration), adopted on 12 August 1992, 
Principle 15. Although the word “shall” is used in Principle 15, it does impose any legal obligation upon the 
States to take precautionary measures. The Rio Declaration is non-binding instrument reciting guidelines in 
which the States may adopt in resolving environmental problems. 
78 Accordingly, it differs from the principle of prevention in that the latter usually comes into play when there is 
sufficient scientific proof. 
79 Laurent A. Ruessmann: “Putting the Precautionary Principle in its Place: Parameters for the Proper 
Application of a Precautionary Approach and the Implications for Developing Countries in Light of the Doha 
WTO Ministerial” (American International Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 5, 2002), p. 909. 
80 EC, Communication, supra note 13, p. 4, para. 4: Also see e.g. Appellate Body Report, EC Measures 
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC-Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 
1998, DSR 1998:I, 135, para. 120; Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, supra note 2, p. 156. 
81 Pfizer Animal Health v Council of the EU (2002) II ECR 3305, paras. 139, 143. 
82 EC-Hormones, supra note 80, para. 194. 
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“If the evidence is sufficiently conclusive to leave little or no room for uncertainty in the calculation of 
risk, then there is no justification for the precautionary principle to be applied at all”.83 
 
Furthermore, the Principle 15 in the Rio Declaration is silent when it comes to the 
determination of an appropriate level of risk, which is indeed an issue that is better answered 
by politicians than courts and scientists. Accordingly, it is up to the States to establish a level 
of protection of health and environment they consider appropriate for their own society.84 
 
Finally, the EC has pointed out that the precautionary principle is more relevant to risk 
management, rather than risk assessment. Whereas the latter is a scientific evaluation of 
potential harm, risk management suggests that “scientific uncertainty precludes a full 
assessment of the risk and when decision-makers consider that the chosen level of 
environmental protection or of human, animal and plant health may be in jeopardy.” This 
approach gives the State a broader margin of discretion in determining the level of 
protection.85 
 
 
3.3.2. WTO Rules Relevant to the Precautionary Principle 
 
 
3.3.2.1. The Principles of Non-Discrimination as Fundamental Rules in WTO 
 
In order to promote fair and equal competition between the member States, the WTO aims to 
not only reduce existing barriers, but to also prevent new ones from developing. In this sense, 
the principle of non-discrimination is a cornerstone of the WTO.86 This principle consists of 
two “sub”-principles; the rule of most-favored nation and the national-treatment rule, and they 
are laid down in GATT, Article I and III, respectively. Both provisions are rather 
comprehensive, and they will hence be explained in short terms: 
 
GATT Article I, concerning customs duties and other charges, requires that “any advantage, 
favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in 
or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the 
like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.”87 In 
other words, special treatment to the goods or services of one WTO member is prohibited 
unless it is given to all WTO members.88 
 
GATT Article III requires that internal taxes and other internal charges “should not be applied 
to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.”89 
Moreover, imported products “shall not be subject (…) to internal taxes or other internal 
charges of any kind in excess of those applied (….) to like domestic products.90 Finally, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Bernie and Boyle, supra note 2, p. 156, footnote 282. 
84 Ibid, p. 161; Pzifer case, supra note 81, para. 151. 
85 Dr. Hans-Joachim Priess and Dr. Christian Pitschasy: “Protection of Public Health and the Role of the 
Precautionary Principle Under WTO Law: A Trojan Horse Before Geneva’s Walls?” (Fordham International 
Law Journal, Vol 24, Issue 1, 2000, 519-553), p. 530. 
86 IISD, supra note 1, p. 26. 
87 GATT, supra note 17, Article I (1). 
88 There are two exceptions to the most-favoured nation rule: 1. Regional trade agreements. 2. Developing 
countries, se IISD, supra note 1, p. 28. 
89 GATT, supra note 17, Article III(1). 
90 Ibid, Article III(2). 
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products “shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products 
of national origin.”91 In short, Article III imposes an obligation upon a member to treat 
imported products equally to the same products manufactured in the importing State.92  
 
A national regulation in a member State that is found to be inconsistent with the principle of 
non-discrimination is to be either withdrawn or modified within a reasonable amount of 
time.93 
 
 
3.3.2.2. GATT Environmental Exceptions: Article XX (b) and (g) 
 
The general exceptions to GATT rules are laid down in Article XX. The introductory clause, 
commonly known as “the chapeau” stipulates that “nothing in the General Agreement 
(GATT) shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of 
measures” justified under paragraphs (a) to (j). The Appellate Body has stated that exceptions 
can be made to all of the obligations in GATT.94  
 
With respect to the environment a member may invoke an exception to the GATT rules if the 
measure falls within the scope of paragraph (b) or (g). Pursuant to (b) the measure for which 
the exception is being invoked must be “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health”. The “necessary “ test entails an obligation for the member invoking the exception to 
demonstrate (i) the necessity to protect its domestic environment, (ii) that the measure in 
question is necessary for this purpose, and (iii) that the measure is the least trade-restrictive 
alternative reasonably available to protect the member’s environment.95 
 
Article XX (g) provides that the measure must be “relating to conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources if such measure made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption.” The member must demonstrate (i) that the measure in question 
concerns “exhaustible natural resources”, (ii) that the measure relates to the “conservation” of 
such resources, (iii) a connection between the measure and the conservation, and (iii) that the 
measure is “made effective in conjunction with” restrictions on the country’s own production 
or consumption.96 
 
Although a measure would otherwise meet the requirements imposed in paragraph (b) and (g) 
(or any of the other exception rules), it would still be illegal under the chapeau of Article XX 
if the measure is “applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade.” The Appellate Body has stated that a balance 
must be struck between the right of a member to invoke an exception and the duty of that 
State to respect the rights of the other States.97 
 
Moreover, the standards set out in the chapeau are necessarily broad in scope and reach. 
Accordingly, the issue whether a measure is discriminatory in an “arbitrary” or “unjustifiable” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Ibid, Article III(4). 
92 IISD, supra note 1, p. 28. 
93 DSU, supra note 18, Article 19(1). 
94 US-Gasoline, supra note 64, p. 24. 
95 Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, supra note 2 pp. 760-761, IISD, supra note 1, pp. 29-30. 
96 Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, ibid, pp. 761. 
97 Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Shrimp-
Turtle), WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VII, 2755, paras. 156. 
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manner, or is a “disguised restriction”, has to be determined on a case-by-case basis as the 
measure may vary.98  
 
Essentially, the restriction rule in the chapeau is to be read in light of its purpose: to prevent 
abuse or misuse of the exception rules. The chapeau expressly addresses the manner in which 
the measure in question is applied, rather than the measure itself or its specific content, and 
can as such be understood as similar to the general principle of good faith.99  
 
Both the chapeau of Article XX and the individual paragraphs entail a burden of proof that 
lies upon the party asserting the justification of the measure. However, the Appellate Body 
has underscored that there is a difference of threshold between the two. In general the party 
that has the burden of proof faces a heavier task in showing that a measure is not “a disguised 
or unjustified discrimination (…) or disguised restriction on international trade”.100 
Consequently, taking a precautionary approach in applying the chapeau is arguably more 
difficult than in the case of application of the individual exception rules. 
 
 
3.3.2.3. Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the SPS Agreement 
 
Unlike GATT, the SPS Agreement imposes a right for WTO members to take sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures (SPS measures) that may affect international trade.101 Such measures 
must have the purposes of protecting human, animal or plant life or health within the member 
State’s territory from risks of inter alia pests, diseases, disease-carrying or disease–causing 
organisms, additives, toxins and contaminants.102  
 
Similar to the chapeau of Article XX, Article 2(1) requires that SPS measures shall neither 
discriminate the Members in an “arbitrarily or unjustifiably” manner, nor constitute a 
“disguised restriction on international trade”. Pursuant to paragraph 2, such measures must be 
“necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health”, and it shall not “more 
trade-restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection,”(Article 5(6)). However, Article 5(6) presumes that it is up to the member 
applying the measure to choose its own appropriate level of protection.103  
 
Additionally, a measure is deemed to be necessary to protect human, animal and plant life or 
health if it is based on “international standards, guidelines or recommendations”, Article 3(1) 
and (2).104 However, pursuant to Article 3(3), a member may establish measures that result in 
a “higher level of (…) protection” than implied in the standards, guidelines or 
recommendations, which may also include a zero risk.105 
 
Moreover, SPS measures shall be based on “scientific principles” and adopted with 
“sufficient scientific evidence” (Article 2(2)). In determining whether a measure meets these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Ibid, para. 120. 
99 US-Gasoline, supra note 64, p. 22; Ibid, para. 158. 
100 US-Gasoline, ibid. 
101 SPS Agreement, supra note 17, Article 1(1).  
102 Ibid., Article 1(2), Annex A(4)(1). 
103 Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, supra note 2, p.779. Also see Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures 
Affecting Importation of Salmon (Australia-Salmon), WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 
1998:VIII, 3327, para. 125. 
104 Also see SPS Agreement, Annex A(3) on international standards, guidelines and recommendations. 
105 See also EC-Hormones, supra note 80, para. 124; SPS Agreement, supra note Article 5(4). 
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criteria, there must be an “adequate relationship” between the measure and the scientific 
evidence, which is “sufficient” when it is gathered through scientific methods”.106  
 
Article 5(7) is particularly relevant to the precautionary principle as it allows SPS measures to 
be provisionally adopted if they are based on “available pertinent information”, and where 
“relevant scientific evidence is insufficient”.107 The Appellate Body has found that “if the 
body of available scientific evidence, in quantitative or qualitative terms, the performance of 
an adequate assessment of risks as required under Article 5(1), the relevant scientific proof is 
“insufficient.108 Article 5(7) is not an exception rule, but must be applied as a qualified 
exemption from the obligation under Article 2(2), that the measure must be maintained with 
sufficient scientific evidence.109 
 
 
3.3.2.4. The Importance of WTO Agreement Preamble in Context of Environmental Issues 
 
Unlike the WTO covered agreements, the preamble of the WTO Agreement contains an 
explicit reference to environment. It provides that the parties are to recognize that their 
relations in international trade of goods and services should be “conducted (…) in accordance 
with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the 
environment.”110 
 
However, as opposed to the provisions under the WTO Agreement, the preamble does not 
have a binding force upon the WTO members. On the other hand, by presenting the purposes 
of the WTO Agreement, the preamble reflects the intentions of the WTO members when the 
treaty was negotiated. Considering the legal relevance of the preamble, the Appellate Body 
has expressed that it must add color, texture and shading to the interpretation of the WTO 
covered agreements.111  
 
Additionally, more directly related to the preamble’s references to environmental protection, 
the Appellate Body has said that “the importance of coordinating policies on trade and the 
environment” has been specifically acknowledged, and that “WTO Members have a large 
measure of autonomy to determine their own policies on the environment (including its 
relationship with trade), their environmental objectives and the environmental legislation they 
enact and implement.” The members can however only take such measures in accordance 
with the requirements of the WTO covered agreements.112 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products (Japan-Agricultural Products II), 
WT/DS76/AB/R, adopted 19 March 1999, DSR 1999:I, 277, para. 84; Appellate Body Report, Japan – 
Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples (Japan-Apples), WT/DS245/AB/R, adopted 10 December 2003, 
DSR 2003:IX, 4391, para. 8.92. 
107 Article 5(7) also include two other criteria: The member must “seek to obtain additional information 
necessary for more objective assessment of risk, and “review the (…) measure accordingly within a reasonable 
time”.   
108 Japan-Apples, supra note 106, para. 179. 
109 Japan-Agricultural Products II, supra note 106, para. 80. 
110 WTO Agreement, supra note 7, Preamble (1). 
111 Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 97, para. 153. 
112 US-Gasoline case, supra note 64, p. 30. 
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PART 4: THE USE OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE 
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: CASE STUDY 
 
 
4.1. Prior to WTO: GATT Panels - Tuna-Dolphin I and II 
 
Before turning to the WTO reports, two GATT panel decisions are worth mentioning since 
they were the first to draw attention to the conflicting link between international trade and 
environmental protection. The so-called Tuna-Dolphin I and II cases pondered whether 
United States had violated 1947 GATT Article XI(1) by establishing certain measures 
forbidding or restricting importation of tuna from countries using methods that also killed 
dolphins during the fishing process. The panels made a strict approach to 1947 GATT, 
suggesting, inter alia, that the exceptions under Article XX are “limited and conditional”, and 
must be interpreted “narrowly”.113  
 
As for the environmental exceptions, the panel stated that the criteria set out in paragraph (b) 
and (g) refer to the trade measure in question, and not to domestic standards adopted in a 
country. The panels also set high thresholds of the requirements set out in Article XX(b) and 
(g) by stating that United States did not have the authority to protect resources beyond its and 
MMPA provisions were therefore not “necessary” within the scope of Article XX(b). Nor 
were the MMPA provisions justified under paragraph (g), as the terms “relating to “and” in 
conjunction with”, according to the panel, meant primarily aimed at “the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources”.114  
 
Due to the lack of proper consideration of international environmental rules (in particular 
MEAs) in the interpretation processes, the Tuna-Dolphin reports have become infamous for 
being rigidly trade focused. As neither decision was adopted by the DSB, they were not 
legally binding under GATT. The reports are nevertheless considered significant as they 
demonstrated the weakness of the old GATT regime in cases of conflict with environmental 
norms.115  
 
4.2. Selected WTO Panels and Appellate Body Reports 
 
 
4.2.1. Selected Reports Related to GATT 
 
4.2.1.1 1996 US – Gasoline Case 
 
Facts and Rulings 
 
The Appellate Body report US-Gasoline concerned a dispute between United States on the 
one side, and Venezuela and Brazil on the other. The issue was whether the US “the Gasoline 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 GATT Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna-Dolphin I), DS21/R, DS21/R, 3 
September 1991, unadopted, BISD 39S/155, para. 5.22. 
114 Ibid, paras. 5.27-5.33; GATT Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna-Dolphin 
II), DS29/R, 16 June 1994, unadopted, para. 6.1. 
115 Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, supra note 2, pp. 765, 771. 
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Rule” prohibiting production and importation of conventional gasoline, was inconsistent with 
GATT Article III(4),116 and not justified under Article XX.117  
The panel agreed with the complainants in that the Gasoline Rule was inconsistent with the 
national treatment principle set out in GATT Article III(4), and justified neither under 
paragraph (b) nor (g) of Article XX.118 The Appellate Body reversed the Panel rulings on 
paragraph(g), but found that “the Gasoline Rule” was contrary to the chapeau.119  
 
Article XX(g) 
 
In its findings the Appellate Body referred to the rules of interpretation in VCLT Article 31-
33. It emphasized the rule provided in Article 31(1), stipulating that the words of a treaty “are 
to be given the ordinary meaning, in their context and in the light of the treaty's object and 
purpose”.120 Particularly with respect to the meaning of “relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources”, the Appellate Body reaffirmed the findings of the panel (and 
the GATT panels in Tuna-Dolphin I and II); that the measure must be “primarily aimed at” 
such conservation.  
 
According to the Appellate Body, the panel had ignored the fact that paragraph (g) must be 
read in conjunction with other provisions of GATT. As other provisions have terms with 
different meanings, it cannot have been the intentions of the GATT negotiators to give them 
the same threshold.121 Consequently, the Appellate Body modified the meaning of “primarily 
aimed at” to include measures that have a “substantial relationship” which is not “merely 
incidentally or inadvertently aimed at” conservation of natural resources.122  
 
The Appellate then turned to the question whether the baseline establishment rules under the 
Gasoline Rule are “made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption", in which the tribunal answered in the affirmative. In its reasoning, the 
Appellate Body pointed out Article 31(1) as the basis for the interpretation the second criteria 
under paragraph (g). It found that if the term “made effective in conjunction with” is to have 
the same threshold as the term “no less favourable” under Article III(4), there would be no 
inconsistency between the measure at issue and the national treatment rule in the first place.123 
 
The Chapeau of Article XX 
 
However, the Appellate Body found that the baseline establishment rules were not satisfied 
under the chapeau of Article XX, since they, in their application, constituted “unjustifiable 
discrimination” and a “disguised restriction on international trade”.124 According to the 
tribunal, the introductory words of the chapeau “nothing in this Agreement” must mean that 
the measure for which the exception is being invoked relate to all obligations under GATT.125 
In its reasoning, the Appellate Body again referred to the contextual aspect of the general rule 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 GATT Article III(4) stipulates that imported products are to be treated “no less favourable than that accorded 
to like products of national origin.” 
117 US-Gasoline, supra note 64, p.2. 
118 Ibid, p. 7. 
119 Ibid. p. 29. 
120 Ibid, p. 17. 
121 Ibid, pp. 17-18. 
122 Ibid, p. 19. 
123 Ibid, p. 21. 
124 Ibid, p. 29. 
125 Ibid, p. 24. 
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of treaty interpretation, and stated that “interpretation (of Article XX) must give meaning and 
affect to all terms of (GATT)”.126 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Thus, the Appellate Body clarified the uncertainty with respect to the general rule of treaty 
interpretation as a basis for interpretation of GATT (and other WTO agreements). It gave 
decisive weight to the ordinary meaning of the GATT language and the context of the treaty 
at the time of its conclusion in order to find the intentions of the parties. The Appellate Body 
nevertheless overlooked the preamble of the WTO Agreement with respect to environmental 
protection as relevant material in finding the contextual meaning of Article XX. Although the 
provisions under GATT were formulated in 1947, the 1994 GATT must be read in connection 
with WTO Agreement.  
 
The Appellate Body did however mention the WTO preamble and the Decision on Trade and 
Environment127, yet in its conclusion it emphasized that the members have “a large autonomy 
to determine their own policies on the environment (…), their environmental objectives and 
the environmental legislation they enact and implement”, as long as they respect the 
obligations under the WTO covered agreements.128 This statement is somewhat related to the 
precautionary principle, but may be considered as an obiter dictum. 
 
Another weakness of the findings of Appellate Body, particularly with regards to Article 
XX(g), relates to the lack of references to other rules of international law, hereunder the 
precautionary principle, as provided in Article 31(3)(c). If the tribunal had taken these factors 
into account, its rulings may have been profoundly sounder.  
 
 
4.2.1.2 1998 Shrimp – Turtle Case 
 
Facts and Rulings 
 
The Shrimp-Turtle case concerned a dispute between India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand 
and the United States. The issue was whether Section 609 of the US Public Law 101-162 
(Section 609), which entailed a ban on imports of shrimps from countries that did not protect 
sea turtles from being caught in the fishing process, was contrary to 1994 GATT Article 
XI(1)129, and not justified under Article XX.130  
 
The panel established to resolve the dispute answered in the affirmative.131 The Appellate 
Body disagreed with the panel in the interpretation of Article XX stating that the trade 
measures under Section 609 were “measures” for the purpose of the chapeau. However, 
although the Appellate Body also found that Section 609 fulfilled the requirements in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Ibid, p. 23. 
127 The Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment, adopted at the Meeting of the Trade Negotiations 
Committee in Marrakesh on 14 April 1994. 
128 US-Gasoline, supra note 64, p. 30. 
129 GATT Article XI(1) provides that “(n)o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges 
(…) shall be instituted or maintained” on the importation and exportation of products. 
130 Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 97, para. 1. 
131 Ibid, para. 5. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   25	  
paragraph (g), it was an “arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination” contrary to the 
requirements of the chapeau.132 
 
Article XX(g) 
 
One of the central issues concerned the interpretation of “exhaustible natural resources”. The 
Appellate Body found that the sea turtles Section 609 aimed to protect fell within the term of 
paragraph (g). In its reasoning the tribunal said:  
 
“The words of Article XX(g), "exhaustible natural resources", were actually crafted more than 50 
years ago. They must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of contemporary concerns of the 
community of nations about the protection and conservation of the environment.” (emphasis added).133 
 
Although the Appellate Body highlighted the importance of the ordinary meaning of the 
words of Article XX earlier in the report134, it also made a crucial point; the national 
communities are rather dynamic in nature, thus their policies, knowledge and concerns change 
over time. Unlike in previous reports, the Appellate Body in this case took an evolutionary 
approach to the interpretation of paragraph (g).135  
 
This point was made even clearer as the tribunal said that “natural resources” is not a static 
term but is “rather (…) evolutionary”.136 The tribunal also considered the WTO preamble, and 
stated that the negotiators during the Uruguay Round were ”fully aware of the importance and 
legitimacy of environmental protection as a goal of national and international policy. The 
preamble of the WTO Agreement -- which informs not only the GATT 1994, but also the 
other covered agreements -- explicitly acknowledges "the objective of sustainable 
development”.” 137 
 
Although the Appellate Body did not discuss the role of Article 31(3)(c), it did in fact refer to 
agreements external to GATT and relevant to the interpretation of “exhaustible natural 
resources”, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). 
Consequently, “exhaustible natural resources” was given a broader definition to encompass 
not only non-living resources, but also living creatures that are in danger of becoming 
extinct.138  
 
The Chapeau of Article XX 
 
The Appellate Body then went on to the meaning of chapeau of Article XX. It turned to the 
preambles of the WTO Agreement and 1947 GATT to seek clarification of the parties’ 
intentions, and pointed out the essential differences of their articulation. While the former 
stipulates that the members are to recognize “the full use of the resources of the world”, the 
latter refers to an “optimal use (…) in accordance with the objective of sustainable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Ibid, paras. 186-187. 
133 Ibid, para. 129. 
134 Ibid, para. 114. 
135 Ilona Cheyne: “Gateways to the Precautionary Principle in WTO Law” (Journal of Environmental Law, 2007, 
Vol.19 No 2, 155-172), p. 164. 
136 Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 97, para. 130. 
137 Ibid, para. 129; Cheyne: supra note 135, p. 164. 
138 Shrimp-Turtle, ibid, paras. 130-134. 
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development”.139 Again, the Appellate Body noted that the preamble of the WTO Agreement 
“demonstrates a recognition by WTO negotiators that optimal use of the world's resources 
should be made in accordance with the objective of sustainable development”, and hence the 
preamble “must add colour, texture and shading to our interpretation of (…) GATT 1994.”140 
 
In order to determine whether Section 609 resulted in an “unjustifiable discrimination”, the 
Appellate Body stated that the conservation of highly migratory species, such as sea turtles, 
demands cooperative efforts before a member can take unilateral action. Later the tribunal 
expressly mentioned Article 31(3), and made extensive references to materials external to the 
WTO.  
 
First, it considered the Decision of Trade and Environment which refers to the environmental 
objectives provided in Rio Declaration and Agenda 21. It then took account of provisions in 
the Convention on Biological Diversity and Convention on the Conservation of Migratory 
Species of Wild Animals. These instruments stipulate that environmental problems are to be 
solved through international consensus.The Appellate Body found that the United States had 
in fact negotiated with some of the WTO members on exports of shrimps into the country, by 
negotiating and concluding the Inter-American Convention. However, this was not sufficient 
since the appellees were not part of this agreement. On this basis, the Appellate Body 
considered Section 609 to be an “unjustifiable discrimination”. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
With respect to Article XX(b), the Appellate Body took a broad approach to the term 
“exhaustible natural resources” to also include endangered species. Although the court did not 
expressly mention the precautionary principle, its reasoning is consistent with the rule in the 
sense that one cannot be certain of the environmental consequences of allowing species to 
become extinct.141 
 
Additionally, it can be argued that the Appellate Body implicitly referred to precautionary 
principles by referring to the importance of sustainable development in the WTO Preamble.142 
 
However, as the Appellate Body shows in reading the chapeau, references to international 
environmental instruments may not always work in favor of the precautionary principle.143 
Nevertheless, since the Appellate Body frequently emphasizes the importance of balancing 
trade and environmental protection, the Shrimp-Turtle case represents a turning point in this 
controversy.  
 
Considering the high threshold in the chapeau, it be argued that the Appellate Body did in fact 
interpret GATT in accordance with other sources of international law, and that the chapeau of 
Article XX may stand as an obstacle for members to take precautionary trade measures. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Ibid, para. 152. 
140 Ibid, para. 152-153. Also see part 4.3.5. in this thesis. 
141 Cheyne, supra note 135, p. 164. 
142 Sustainable development may be regarded as an “umbrella principle” encompassing other norms such as the 
precautionary principle and the polluter-pays principles, Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher: Perspectives on 
the Precautionary Principle (Sydney: The Federation Press, 1999), p. 155. 
143 Cheyne, supra note 135, p. 166. 
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4.2.1.3. 2001 EC – Asbestos Case 
 
Facts and Rulings 
 
The EC-Asbestos case concerned a claim brought by Canada against the EC that the French 
Decree No. 96-1133 (the Decree) prohibiting asbestos and asbestos containing products, 
including imports of such products, violated, inter alia, GATT Article III(4), and were not 
justified under Article XX.144 The panel established to resolve the dispute found that the 
Decree was inconsistent with Article III(4), but justified as such by the chapeau and 
paragraph (b) of Article XX.145 The Appellate Body upheld the panel’s conclusion that the 
Decree met the requirements under paragraph (b), but also found that the measure was 
consistent with Article III(4).146 
 
Article III(4) 
 
One of the main issues was whether asbestos and so-called “PCG” fibers, were “like 
products” within the meaning of Article III(4). In the interpretation of the term, the Appellate 
Body considered in detail its contextual meaning.147 First it observed a previous case 
concerning interpretation of Article III(2), which stated that “like” is a relative term and 
cannot be given a precise definition. The meaning must be determined, inter alia, in light of 
the circumstances that prevail in any given case. Second, the Appellate Body held that other 
WTO provisions containing the requirement “like products” are relevant in the interpretation. 
Considering the textual differences in these provisions, the term “like” in general does not 
have to mean “identical”, but can also refer to “similar”.148  
 
As for “like products” in Article III(4) in particular, the panels stated that the domestic and 
imported products in question must be in a competitive relationship. Although the Appellate 
Body adopted the panel’s broad approach, it also held that other criteria, inter alia, physical 
property, nature and quality of the products, must be considered in the evaluation. In the 
particular circumstances of the case, the tribunal stated that asbestos fibers are more toxic, and 
thus a greater risk to human health, than PCG. Along with an extensive evaluation of other 
relevant evidence, the Appellate Body concluded that asbestos fibers and PCG were not “like 
products”.149 
 
Article XX(b) 
 
Another key issue in EC-Asbestos concerned whether the Decree was “necessary to protect 
human (…) life or health” within the meaning of Article XX(b). Even though the provision 
does not include requirement of a risk assessment, the Appellate Body noted that the measure 
in question must be based on relevant scientific proof of a risk to human health. The risk may 
however, be determined either in quantitative or qualitative terms. In the particular 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products (EC-Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, 3243 
paras. 1, 18. 
145 Ibid, para. 4. 
146 Ibid, para. 192. 
147 The Appellate Body did not expressly mention the general rule, but it implied that Article III(4) shall be 
interpreted in accordance with “the normal customary international law rules of international law”, para. 115. 
148 Ibid, paras. 88-89. 
149 Ibid, paras. 97-98, 100-101, 114, 125. The Appellate Body also considered three other criteria; consumers’ 
tastes and habits, end-uses and tariff classification, see paras. 119-124. 
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circumstances of the case, the Appellate Body found the Decree to be clearly aimed at 
protecting human health.150 
 
As for determining whether the measure is “necessary” to protect human health, the Appellate 
Body emphasized the members’ undisputed right to determine, either quantitatively or 
qualitatively, the level of protection that they find appropriate in any given situation. As the 
tribunal accepted France’s attempt to eliminate the spread of asbestos-related health risks, it 
also implied that determination of the level of protection might also include a zero-risk.151 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In this case France had presented sufficient evidence of risk, and did therefore not have to 
invoke the precautionary principle as a reason for justifying the Decree under Article XX(b). 
The reasoning of the court however, is important because it allows the members to take a 
precautionary approach when determining the appropriate level of protection.152 
 
On the other hand, the report also shows that the precautionary principle falls short as 
reference material in the interpretation of “protect”, that is in terms of burden of proof; while 
the Appellate Body includes a requirement of a risk assessment, the precautionary principle 
presupposes that there is scientific uncertainty.153 
 
 
4.2.2. Reports Related to SPS Agreement 
 
4.2.2.1 1998 EC – Hormones Case 
 
Facts and Rulings 
 
In 1997 the United States asked for the establishment of a panel to determine whether certain 
measures under an EC directive that banned imports of meat and meat products derived from 
cattle treated with certain natural hormones for growth promotion purposes were contrary to, 
inter alia, Articles 3(1), 3(3), and 5(1) of the SPS Agreement. The panel concluded that the 
measures were inconsistent with all three provisions. EC appealed to the Appellate Body, 
which upheld that the measures were contrary to Articles 3(3) and 5(1), but reversed the 
panel’s conclusion with regards to Article 3(1).154 
 
The Precautionary Principle in Articles 3(3) and 5(7) 
 
This was the first case where the WTO judiciary was asked to clarify whether the 
precautionary principle was an established customary rule of international law. The EC 
claimed that the panel had erred in properly taking account of the principle in interpreting the 
SPS provisions, since the rule had become "a general customary rule of international law or at 
least a general principle of law".155  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Ibid, paras. 115, 157, 167, 161-162. 
151 Ibid, para. 168. 
152 Cheyne, supra note 135, p. 163. 
153Priess and Pitschasy, supra note 85, p. 539. 
154 EC-Hormones, supra note 80, paras. 2,6, 253. 
155 Ibid, para. 16. 
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The Appellate Body decided not to take a position as to the legal status of the precautionary 
principle, as it considered it to be “unnecessary, and probably imprudent” and “still awaiting 
authoritative formulation”. Nevertheless, the court upheld the panel’s statement by suggesting 
that although the precautionary principle was reflected in both Articles 3(3) and 5(7) as well 
as in paragraph 6 in the SPS preamble, it was neither written nor given a specific meaning in 
the SPS Agreement. As a result, it could therefore not relieve the obligation of the WTO 
judiciary to interpret the SPS provisions in accordance with the customary rules of treaty 
interpretation as provided in Article 31. The Appellate Body emphasized that the terms in the 
SPS Agreement must be given the ordinary meaning in accordance with treaty context and in 
the light of its object and purpose, in which the precautionary principle could not override.156 
 
Articles 2(2), 3(3) and 5(1) 
 
As the precautionary principle alone could not influence the contextual interpretation of the 
SPS Agreement, the Appellate Body dismissed the argument that Article 3(3) is not to be read 
in connection with Article 5(1). Even though a member, in accordance with Article 3(3), may 
choose a higher level of SPS protection than of international standard, recommendations and 
guidelines, it is not “an absolute or unqualified right”. The level of protection must be based 
not only on “sufficient scientific evidence” (Article 2(2)), but also a “risk assessment” 
(Article 5(1)). Therefore, the EC was required to present sufficient scientific proof that the 
meat from hormone-treated farm animal included a risk to cancer.157 
 
With respect to the meaning of “risk assessment”, the Appellate Body disagreed with the 
Panel by stating that it entails a scientific examination and not a political decision. The term 
“risk management” is never used in the SPS Agreement, and the rule of treaty interpretation 
obligates the interpreter to read “the words actually used by the agreement under examination, 
and not words which the interpreter may feel should have been used.”158 
 
Moreover, the Appellate Body agreed with the panel’s contextual reading of Articles 5(1) and 
2(2).  Since both the assessment of risk to human, animal or plant health and the measure 
itself shall be based on “sufficient scientific evidence”, there must be a “rational relationship” 
between the two. Put in other words, the results of the risk assessment must “reasonably 
support the SPS measure” in question.159  
 
Despite the seemingly low threshold of “sufficient” scientific evidence, the Appellate Body 
found that although EC had shown that certain hormones have carcinogenic potential, they 
had not evaluated the hormones used specifically for growth promotion purposes.160 In this 
sense, EC had failed in carrying out a proper risk assessment based on “sufficient scientific 
evidence” within the meaning of Article 5(1) and (2). Accordingly, the SPS measure taken by 
EC was contrary to Article 5(1) and also inconsistent with Article 3(3).161   
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158 Ibid, para. 181. 
159 Ibid, paras. 180, 193. 
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161 Ibid, para. 209. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
Although the Appellate Body recognized the obligation to interpret the SPS Agreement in 
accordance with the general rule of treaty interpretation, it did not take into account Article 
31(3)(c). The disputing parties did not invoke the provision, furthermore, the question as to 
whether the precautionary principle is an established rule of customary international law was 
not addressed. 
 
It may be argued that the Appellate Body implicitly understood the precautionary principle as 
a non-binding norm, since it read “risk assessment” as a scientific evaluation and not a 
political decision. Nonetheless, the Appellate Body should have taken a position as to whether 
the principle has become a customary rule of international law binding on the parties involved 
in the dispute. Due to the fact that precautionary principle finds reflection in Articles 3(3), 
5(7) and the SPS preamble, which may constitute an opinio juris of the members, the 
Appellate Body ought to have considered this issue since it would give clarity to the SPS 
provisions.162 
 
If the Appellate Body had come to the conclusion that the precautionary principle is an 
established international customary rule, the SPS Agreement would prevail regardless, due to 
its legal status as lex specialis, however the point is that the tribunal overlooked this 
argument.163  
 
Moreover, as the EC had not invoked Article 5(7), and the Appellate Body refrained from 
determining whether the SPS measures were justified by the exemption rule. However, 
considering the tribunal’s contextual interpretation of the SPS provisions, a member may 
invoke Article 5(7) only if the measure in question is based on a risk assessment, even when 
the measure is based on “available pertinent information”.164 It can therefore be argued that 
the Appellate Body sees the precautionary principle as an approach, and not as a rule. 
 
 
4.2.2.2. 2006 EC – Biotech Case 
 
Facts and Rulings 
 
In the EC-Biotech panel report, the United States, Canada and Argentina requested the 
establishment of a panel to determine the legitimacy of certain safeguard measures adopted by 
a number of EC members. The measures prohibited or restricted imports or marketing of 
agricultural biotech products in order prevent the release of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) into the environment. The complainant claimed that the measures were inconsistent 
with, inter alia, SPS Agreement Articles 5(1) and 5(7). The panel concluded that the measure 
was not based on a risk assessment, and hence contrary to Article 5(1). Additionally, the EC 
had also acted inconsistently with Article 5(7).165 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Lagomarsino, supra note 21, p. 565. 
163 Pauwelyn, supra note 22, p. 482. Also see pp. 133-143, where the author nuances the relationship between 
treaties and custom. 
164 Priess and Pitschasy, supra note 85, p. 546. 
165 EC-Biotech, supra note 57, paras. 1.3.-2.1., 3.2.-3.6. The complainants also challenged the legitimacy of the 
alleged general EC moratorium on approvals of biotech products and certain EC Directives containing measures 
on the approval of specific biotech products, EC-Biotech. 
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The Legal Status of the Precautionary Principle 
 
In this case the EC also invoked the precautionary principle as a “fully fledged and general 
principle of international law”.166 In this respect, the panel found it necessary to recall the 
position taken by the Appellate Body in the EC-Hormones case. Although the latter report 
was adopted in 1998, the panel noted that “the legal debate over whether the precautionary 
principle constitutes a recognized principle of general or customary international law is still 
ongoing.”167 
 
Similar to the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones, the panel considered it to be impudent to 
provide an answer to the question whether the precautionary principle has attained the status 
of international customary law, especially if it was unnecessary to do so. The panel thus 
decided to refrain from expressing a view on the matter.168 
 
The Relevance of Non-WTO Rules 
 
One of the most significant aspects of this report is the rather extensive review of the 
relationship between WTO law and other rules of international law. In this regard, the EC 
argued that, pursuant to VCLT Article 31(3)(c), the Panel is required to take into 
consideration the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Biosafety Protocol, of which 
both contain provisions reflecting the precautionary principle.169  
 
The panel, however, adopted the narrow interpretation of “the parties” in the Tuna Dolphin II 
report170; that “the parties” in Article 31(3)(c) refer to the WTO members and not the parties 
to the dispute. Argentina and Canada had signed but not ratified the Biosafety Protocol, and 
the United States was a party to neither of the treaties, and they were therefore not applicable 
in the present case.171 
 
The panel further noted that non-WTO rules which are not binding on the WTO members 
might be used as an interpretative tool in finding the “ordinary meaning” of the treaty terms, 
pursuant to Article 31(1). The court also underlined that it is not obliged to consider other 
rules of international unless they are deemed to be relevant in the interpretation process.172 In 
the present case, however, the panel did not find it necessary or appropriate to rely on the 
provisions in the Biosafety Protocol and the Convention on Biological Diversity as referred to 
by the EC.173 
 
Article 5(1) and 5(7) 
 
The EC claimed that Article 5(7) does not require an SPS measure to be based on an 
assessment of risk. Read in connection with Article 5(1) which obligates the members to carry 
out a “risk assessment”, Article 5(7) implies only that the SPS measure must be based on an 
“assessment” or “a more objective assessment”. The panel, however, found that the meaning 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Ibid, para. 7.75. Due to the unclear meaning of the claim, the panel stated that it is prepared to consider 
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167 Ibid, paras. 7.86-7.88. 
168 Ibid, para. 7.89. 
169 Ibid, paras. 7.52-7.53. 
170 Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 114, para. 4.27. 
171 EC-Biotech, supra note 57, paras. 7.65-7.75. 
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of “a more objective assessment (…) of risk” indeed refer to a risk assessment. Thus, for a 
measure to be justified under Article 5(7), the SPS measure must be based on a risk 
assessment as required under Article 5(1).174 
 
Furthermore, the panel recalled the statement in Japan-Agricultural Product II, that Article 
5(7) is not an exception rule to the general obligation under Article 2(2), stipulating that an 
SPS measure must be based on “sufficient scientific evidence”, but a right for the members to 
adopt such measures on the basis of “available pertinent information”. The panel also 
underlined that this right is a qualified one, in the sense that the four requirements in Article 
5(7) are cumulative in nature.175 
 
Accordingly, the panel found that the same line must be drawn between Article 5(7) and (1). 
In order to determine whether “scientific evidence is insufficient”, a member must first 
examine whether sufficient scientific evidence in fact exists. That is to say that Article 5(7) 
contains an “implicit reference” to Article 5(1).176 
 
The panel also referred to the Japan-Apples report, where the Appellate Body stated that “the 
application of Article 5.7 is triggered not by the existence of scientific uncertainty, but by the 
insufficiency of scientific evidence". The panel therefore rejected ECs argument that 
“scientific uncertainty” and “insufficiency of scientific evidence” are interchangeable terms. 
As for the SPS measures at issue, the panel concluded that the EC had not carried out a “risk 
assessment” within the meaning of Article 5(1). The safeguard measures were therefore also 
contrary to Article 5(7). 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Due to the fact that the EC never invoked the provisions in the environmental treaties as 
applicable law before the panel, one may question why it did discuss the difference between 
non-WTO rules as applicable law and as an interpretative tool. In any case, according to the 
findings of the panel, the precautionary principle may be applied as assistance in finding the 
“ordinary meaning” of the treaty term. Nevertheless, it would be up to the court to consider 
the relevance of the principle as a reference material in any given case. 
 
With respect to the interpretation of “risk assessment”, the panel may have taken the same 
approach to the legal status of the precautionary principle as the Appellate Body in EC-
Hormones, but the panel most likely should have expressed its opinion on this matter. If it had 
answered the question in the affirmative, the precautionary principle may have been 
considered as applicable law before the panel in the present case. Much like the case in EC-
Hormones, the SPS provisions would most likely prevail as lex specialis. On the other hand, 
the panel could have been obliged to consider the precautionary principle as a reference 
material in the interpretation of the SPS provisions (pursuant to Article 31(3)(c)), which the 
Panel unfortunately did not take a stance on. 
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PART 5: CONCLUSION 
 
 
Whereas the mission of the WTO is to liberalize trade among its members by prohibiting 
barriers to trade, the precautionary principle is the notion that State should take protective 
actions. These may include trade restrictions when there is a risk of serious environmental 
harm. Consequently, WTO rules prohibiting trade barriers may be inconsistent with the 
precautionary principle. This apparent conflict is not limited to the relationship between the 
multilateral trade regime and international environmental law, and can be construed as one of 
several consequences of fragmentation of international law. 
 
Subsequent to the Tuna-Dolphin reports published by the preceding GATT panels, the WTO 
Panels and the Appellate Body have taken a more consistent and internationally principled 
approach to treaty interpretation.177 The US-Gasoline report, followed by later Panels and 
Appellate Body reports, confirmed that the WTO is just another branch of international law 
by recognizing that the WTO agreements must be interpreted in accordance with the 
customary principles of treaty interpretation enshrined in Article 31 of the VCLT. The issue is 
therefore not if, but how and in what circumstances the WTO judiciary considers non-WTO 
rules, in this context the precautionary principle as a customary rule of international law. 
 
It is well established in WTO jurisprudence that the members have an autonomous right to 
determine a level of protection of health or environment whichever they consider appropriate, 
even if the chosen level includes a “zero risk”. Considering that exercising discretion is at the 
heart of the precautionary principle, the WTO judiciary has shown a propensity to allow the 
members to take precautionary actions.178 
 
On the other hand, the panels and the Appellate Body have also made it clear that this right is 
not absolute, neither in the context of GATT nor the SPS Agreement. Before the members can 
invoke either GATT Article XX(b) or SPS Agreement Article 5(7), they shall first examine 
whether sufficient scientific proof of risk exist, and that they also must show that there is a 
relationship between the risk assessment and the measure in question. Hence the WTO 
adjudicators restrict how the level of protection may be achieved. The precautionary principle 
is simply not applicable because it is only relevant when there is “sufficient scientific 
uncertainty” or a “reason to believe” that a State action may damage health or the 
environment.179 
 
Shrimp-Turtle stands out as the Appellate Body did a broader interpretation of “exhaustible 
natural resources” in Article XX(g). Allowing the WTO preamble and international 
environmental rules, including non-binding principles, shaped the contextual meaning of the 
term. The report may also have shown the willingness of considering the precautionary 
principle in interpreting the chapeau of Article XX although the external sources used in the 
present case were to its disadvantage. The report has, however, been criticized for not 
respecting the obligation to interpret GATT in accordance with Article 31(1).180 	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Generally, it can be argued that the provisions under GATT are in point of fact not designed 
for allowing recourse of the precautionary principle because the treaty was written in 1947. 
Thus it predates the need to combat environmental damage as a matter of international 
concern. The SPS Agreement is a more recent agreement, and WTO judiciary has recognized 
that the precautionary principle is reflected in Articles 3(3) and 5(7). It has also noted, 
however, that the relevant SPS provisions relate to a “risk assessment”, rather than “risk 
management”, and hence restricted the members’ access to invoke the precautionary principle 
as a recourse to take protective measures.  
 
EC-Biotech may have shown potential in applying environmental treaties (MEAs) as relevant 
rules of international law pursuant to Article 31(3)(c). Seemingly the Panel made an 
unconstructive contribution by reiterating the GATT panels’ comparatively narrow 
interpretation of “the parties”, and as such refused to consider inferably relevant MEAs. In 
this sense, the Panel has been widely criticized by scholars for taking an “unnecessary 
parochial approach” or being “overly restrictive in its use of non-WTO sources.”181  
 
Of what is said above, the WTO judiciary has arguably taken a precautionary approach rather 
than referring to the precautionary principle as a legally binding rule, which may explain why 
the Panels and the Appellate Body have been reluctant to apply Article 31(3)(c). On the other 
hand, it may be argued that the precautionary principle as a relevant rule is gradually 
emerging in WTO jurisprudence; an issue where the lack of case of law on the matter 
confounds a definitive stance.182 
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